UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-14-2008

Christian v. Mason Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
35331

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Christian v. Mason Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35331" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2119.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2119

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

JERRY CHRISTIAN and
JOY CHRISTIAN, husband and wife,

)

)
)
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
DAVID MASON,
)
_____________,___.;;;.c__ _
Defendant/Respondent.
/

Supreme Court Case No. 35331

.,,.

FflED-COPY
supremeruourt _court of Appe 1
Entered on ATS b

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT~s~·

"-

,...::::;=~~r."".=;,_:J

On Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial
District of the State ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, Presiding

David A. Johnson

Michael Christian, No. 4311

WRIGHT, WRIGHT & JOHNSON, PLLC
477 Shoup Avenue, Suite 109
PO Box 52251
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405

MARCUS, CHRISTIAN & HARDEE, LLP

737 North J1h Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorneys for Respondent

Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.

l

IL Argument and authority.

2

A.

Mason's argument that the bankruptcy trustee had the
right to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim during the
entire limitation period under the UFTA ignores the
restriction on the trustee's ability to act contained in
11 U.S.C. § 546(a).

2

B.

This Court may direct entry of summary judgment to
the Christians, where the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment below and the material facts are
undisputed.

7

c.

Mason has admitted that he is the first transferee of
excess funds from McClung, and whether the funds
were subsequently transferred to his father is irrelevant
for purposes of Mason's liability under the UFTA.

8

D.

All amounts that Mason received from McClung in
excess of what he "invested" in the Ponzi scheme are
recoverable fraudulent transfers, as there are no
"earnings" in a Ponzi scheme to trace or account for,
and there is no reasonably equivalent value given for
the excess transfers.

9

E.

Mason is not entitled to a fee award.

12
12

III. CONCLUSION

ii

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Donnell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 775 n. 7 (9 th Cir. 2008) ............................................. 5, 9, IO, l l
Heaper v. Brown, 214 B.R. 576 (8 th Cir. BAP 1997) ..................................................................... 6
Hiebv.Mitchell, 117Idaho 1075, 1079(1990) ............................................................................. 7
In re Ahead By a Length. Inc., 100 B.R. 157, 164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) .................................. 4
In re Avi. Inc., 389 B.R. 721 (9th Cir. BAP 2008) .......................................................................... 6
In re Hammer, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3359, *4-*5 (W.D. Wa.) ........................................................ 3
In re Integrated Agri. Inc., 313 B.R. 419, 427-428 (C.D. Ill. 2004) ............................................... 4
In re Slatkin, 243 Fed. Appx. 255, 258 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................... 6
In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 593 (9 th Cir. 1991) .................................................. 5, IO
Klingman v. Levinson, 158 B.R. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ............................................................... 3, 5
Pocatello R.R. Fed. Credit Union v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 444,447 (1996) .................... 7
Sublimity Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 127 Idaho 707, 709 (1995) ................................................................. 7
Statutes
11 u.s.c. § 362 ............................................................................................................................... 4
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) ...................................................................................................................... 4
11 u.s.c. § 544 ........................................................................................................................... 3, 5
11 U.S.C. § 546(a) ................................................................................................................. passim
11 u.s.c. § 548 ............................................................................................................................... 5
LC.§ 12-121 ................................................................................................................................. 12
LC.§ 55-9l 7(2)(a) .......................................................................................................................... 8
Other Authorities
4 Collier on Bankruptcy,§ 546.02(l)(b) (15th ed. 1989) ............................................................... 4

iii

I.

Introduction.

The issue in this case is whether appellants the Christians had a right to pursue a
fraudulent transfer claim against respondent Mason to recover funds transferred to Mason by
Robert McClung, in excess of the amounts provided by Mason to McClung during McClung's
operation of a Ponzi scheme. The undisputed facts establish that fraudulent transfers occurred.
The district court ruled that the fraudulent transfer claim was preempted by federal bankruptcy
law, and dismissed the Christians' complaint. In their opening brief, the Christians established
that once the trustee's ability to commence an avoidance action expired, other creditors such as
the Christians were free to pursue their own fraudulent transfer claims against third party
transferees such as Mason, and the district court erred. Mason argues that the trustee had the
right to act until the expiration of the UFTA statute of limitations, such that the trustee owned the
fraudulent transfer claim against Mason until it was expired as to all creditors. As explained
below, this ignores the restriction on the trustee's ability to act under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). The
cases Mason cites actually support the Christians. Mason also repeats his arguments from below
that the money he received from McClung actually belonged to his father, and that last amounts
he received were "return of principal" and not fraudulent transfers. Again, the cases Mason cites
actually support the Christians, and Mason admits the material facts establishing that he is liable
under the UFTA. Summary judgment should have been granted to the Christians, not Mason.
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II.
A.

Argument and authority.

Mason's argument that the bankruptcy trustee had the
right to pursue a fraudulent transfer claim during the
entire limitation period under the UFTA ignores the
restriction on the trustee's ability to act contained in 11
U.S.C. § 546(a).

Mason does not dispute the district court's finding that he received $32,873.12
more from McClung than he gave to McClung. It is also undisputed that Mason received that
excess amount in the three payments he received from McClung within four years of the date the
Christians filed suit against Mason to avoid McClung' s fraudulent transfer. 1
Mason's main argument is essentially that the trustee in bankruptcy had the same
four-year limitations period under the UFTA in which to file an action to avoid McClung's
fraudulent transfers, and that as a result no creditor other than the trustee could ever pursue a
fraudulent transfer claim against McClung's transferees. Mason cites no authority directly in
support of this assertion. He omits any discussion of 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), which (at the time of
McClung' s bankruptcy filing) required the trustee to bring an action to avoid a transfer by
McClung, whether under state law or under federal law, no later than either two years after
McClung' s April 16, 2003 bankruptcy petition (i.e., April 16, 2005), or one year after the first
appointment of a trustee in the bankruptcy on April 17, 2003 (i.e., April 17, 2004). Christians
did not file suit until well over a year after the trustee's ability to act had been lost pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 546(a).
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Mason confuses the statute of limitations under the UFTA - four years from the
date of the transfer - with the time limit imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) for a trustee in
bankruptcy to commence an avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 544 following the
commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. The fact that § 544 permits the trustee to proceed
under state law does nothing to change the requirement under§ 546(a) that the trustee act within
its time limits. This is so because the Trustee's standing to act at all is a creature of federal law,
made possible by 11 U.S.C. § 544. E.g., In re Hammer, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3359, *4-*5 (W.D.
Wa.) ("Section 546(a) limits the time in which a trustee can assert an avoidance action, including
an avoidance action under section 544(b ). Although a trustee's claim may arise under a state
fraudulent conveyance statute, as in the instant case, the trustee's standing to assert that claim
only arises by virtue of section 544(b) on the petition date. When the petition is filed, the trustee
is authorized to evaluate potential fraudulent transfers and, within the limits of section 546(a),
bring a cause of action for avoidance.").
Thus, the trustee's ability to pursue an avoidance claim may be lost either
because: ( a) the four year statute of limitations under the UFTA expires before the bankruptcy
petition is filed or the trustee is appointed; or (b) the time for the trustee to act under§ 546(a) has
passed, even though the UFTA limitations period has not yet expired.

In the latter case (as

here), individual creditors are then free to pursue UFTA claims against third party transferees,
for transfers occurring within the UFTA statute of limitations. Klingman v. Levinson, 158 B.R.

As previously noted, Christians filed suit against Mason on July 20, 2006. CR 4. Mason received the
excess amounts from McClung in payments dated July 22, 2002, July 29, 2002, and October 2, 2002. CR 27, 49,
66, 68, 86.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS - 3

109 (N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Integrated Agri, Inc., 313 B.R. 419, 427-428 (C.D. Ill. 2004) ("The
landscape changes, however, once it is determined that the Trustee's claim is no longer viable. A
creditor regains standing to pursue a state law fraudulent conveyance action, in its own name and
for its own benefit, once the statute of limitations expires on the bankruptcy trustee's right to
bring the claim.... At that point, the bankruptcy court ordinarily would have no jurisdiction to
hear the creditor's suit to recover from a third party transferee and the suit must be filed or
revived in a non-bankruptcy forurn.")2; 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, § 546.02(l)(b) (15th ed. 1989)
("If the state law limitations period governing a fraudulent transfer action has not expired at the

commencement of a bankruptcy case, the trustee may bring the action pursuant to section 544(b ),
provided that it is commenced within the section 546(a) limitations period."); In re Ahead By a
Length, Inc., 100 B.R. 157, 164 (Banla. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that to sue successfully under§
544(b), "the trustee must have commenced suit within two years of her appointment . . . on a
cause of action which was viable under applicable law on the date that the bankruptcy petition
was filed"). 3

2

This is exactly what happened here; after the trustee in McC!ung's hankruptcy failed to act within the time
allowed by 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), the Christians sued Mason in state court under Idaho's version of the UFTA.
3

These decisions also make clear that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 is not relevant; once the
trustee has failed to act within the allotted time under§ 546(a), a creditor's suit against a third party transferee (not
against the debtor) does not relate to property of the bankruptcy estate, and the automatic stay does not apply. It is
the claim, while it remains viable under § 546(a), which belongs to the bankruptcy estate; the fraudulently
transferred property does not become property of the bankruptcy estate until (and if) it is recovered by the trustee.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541( a)(3) (providing that an "interest in property that the trustee recovers" becomes property of the
estate). Thus, once the trustee's claim is extinguished by the passage of the time allowed under § 546(a), a
creditor's claim against a third party to recover fraudulently transferred property is not affected by the bankruptcy.
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There is no authority for the proposition that the state UFTA statute of limitations
extends the trustee's time to commence an avoidance action beyond that allowed under§ 546(a)
- a result which would effectively have state law preempting federal law in the bankruptcy arena.
Rather, as the Christians discussed at length in their opening brief, the authority is directly to the
contrary.
Mason completely ignores 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), and he mischaracterizes Klingman
v. Levinson, 158 B.R. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1993), as holding that the trustee's right to act expires only
when the bankruptcy closes. In fact, § 546(a) clearly provides that the trustee's right expires at
the earlier of (a) two years from the petition or one year from the appointment of a trustee; or (b)
closure of the bankruptcy proceeding. The district court in Klingman recognized as much and
stated that (as to the version of§ 546(a) then in effect): "The trustee's right to bring an action to
recover a fraudulent conveyance is subject to the time limitations of 11 U.S.C. § 546(a), which
limits the trustee to the earlier of two years after his appointment or the time the case is closed or
dismissed." 158 B.R. at 113 n. 3. Mason's characterization is wrong. Notably, he does not
discuss any of the other authority on point referenced by the Christians.
The decisions cited by Mason do support his argument. The cases he cites for the
proposition that "a trustee can pursue fraudulent conveyances under state law" (Respondents'
Brief, p. 4) do not hold that state law preempts or extends the time limits for action by the trustee
contained in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). They state no more than the fact that a trustee may avoid
fraudulent transfers either under the bankruptcy code (11 U.S.C. § 548) or under state law (as
provided in 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)). See Dom1ell v. Kawell, 533 F.3d 762, 775 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2008);
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In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1991). The court in In re Slatkin, 243
Fed. Appx. 255, 258 (9 th Cir. 2007) actually recognized that § 546(a) only "provides a trustee
with up to two years in which to commence an action against a fraudulent transfer." Mason's
argument is contrary to both 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) and the cases he relies upon.
Similarly, Mason's assertion that the bankruptcy trustee "has the ability to use
different causes of action which in turn allows for different statutes of limitation," such that the
trustee "also has the ability to use Idaho's longer statute of limitation" is not supported by
decisions he cites for that proposition. See Respondent's Brief, p. 6. In re Avi, Inc., 389 B.R.
721 (9th Cir. BAP 2008) involved only the question of whether a trustee could avoid a
subsequent transfer without first avoiding the initial fraudulent transfer by the debtor. It contains
no discussion of the application of§ 546(a). It is inapposite. In Heaver v. Brown, 214 B.R. 576
(8th Cir. BAP 1997), the court held only that Missouri's newly-enacted version of the UFTA did
not apply retrospectively. It did not discuss the application of 11 U.S.C. § 546, probably because
the trustee filed a complaint to avoid a fraudulent transfer of the debtor the same year as the
debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, i.e., within the time required by § 546(a). Heaver is
inapposite. Again, Mason's argument misses the distinction between the limitations period for a

claim under the UFTA, and the restriction on the trustee's ability to commence an action to
assert such a claim, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). 4

4

Mason's argument that there is no evidence the trustee "abandoned" its right to assert a fraudulent transfer
claim (Respondent's Brief, p. 6) again misses the point- the trustee had to act within the time provided in 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(a), or it would no longer have a viable claim. Its failure to act within the required time is the equivalent of au
affirmative abandonment.
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Following the lapse of time allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) for the bankruptcy
trustee to commence an action to avoid McClung's fraudulent transfers - whether under federal
law or under Idaho's version of the UFTA - individual creditors, including the Christians,
became free to pursue UFTA claims against excess transferees such as Mason. Klingman, supra;
In re Integrated Agri, Inc., supra. The district court's decision to the contrary was error. 5

B.

This Court may direct entry of summary judgment to
the Christians, where the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment below and the material facts are
undisputed.

Mason initially asserts that the district court's ruling constitutes an unreviewable
denial of Christians' motion for summary judgment. In fact, this court has vacated summary
judgment for one party and directed entry of summary judgment for the other, where the material
facts were undisputed and judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. E.g., Hieb v. Mitchell,
117 ldaho 1075, 1079 (1990); Pocatello R.R. Fed. Credit Union v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 129 Idaho
444, 447 (1996); Sublimity Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 127 Idaho 707, 709 (1995). This is such a case.
The material facts are undisputed: Mason admitted in his complaint that McClung operated a
Ponzi scheme in which he was a participant, and has admitted through course of the proceedings
below and again in this court that he was an initial transferee from McClung in the amount of

5

Mason also apparently asserts that because Jerry Christian participated in the unsecured creditor's
committee in McClung's bankruptcy, he was required to force the trustee to act within the time required by 11
U.S.C. § 546(a). There is no authority for this proposition. Likewise, Mason's assertion that the Christians "took
intentional steps to appropriate the cause of action for themselves" is baseless; the Christians did not pursue their
fraudulent transfer claim against Mason until a year after the trustee had lost the ability to do so and any creditor of
McClung was free to pursue the funds fraudulently transferred to Mason. The equities do not favor Mason keeping
other investors' money. As the Ninth Circuit panel stated in the decision mainly relied upon by Mason: "We see
nothing inequitable in the effort to mitigate the losses suffered by other innocent investors." Donnell, 533 F.3d at
776.
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$32,873.12 in excess of the principal amount he provided to McClung. He has admitted below
and here that all of the excess transfers to him occurred within the four year limitation period
under the UFTA. He has admitted that the Christians are judgment creditors of McClung in an
amount far exceeding the amount of the excess transfers to him.

Under these undisputed

material facts, Christians are entitled to summary judgment.

C.

Mason has admitted that he is the first transferee of
excess funds from McClung, and whether the funds
were subsequently transferred to his father is irrelevant
for purposes of Mason's liability under the UFTA.

Literally in the first two sentences of his argument that the excess funds at issue
belong to his father, Mason admits that he is nevertheless liable to Christians for McClung's
transfer of the money to him. He first acknowledges that "Idaho law allows recovery against
'the first transferee of the asset' ..." under LC. § 55-917(2)(a), and in the next sentence admits
that "Mason was the payee on the checks" from McClung. Respondent's Brief, p. 10. LC.§ 55917(2)(a) provides that where a transfer is avoidable,judgment may be entered against "The first
transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made" (emphasis added).
This means that the Christians had the option, but were not required, to seek judgment against
Mason's father.

On its face § 917(2)(a) allows them to obtain judgment against the initial

transferee, which Mason admits is him.
The Christians also set forth in their opening brief the undisputed facts
establishing that Mason was the transferee from McClung. Whether Mason owed the money to
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his father is irrelevant. Because Mason was the first transferee of the funds from McClung, the
Christians are entitled to judgment against him.

D.

All amounts that Mason received from McClung in
excess of what he "invested" in the Ponzi scheme are
recoverable fraudulent transfers, as there are no
"earnings" in a Ponzi scheme to trace or account for,
and there is no reasonably equivalent value given for
the excess transfers.

Mason repeats his argument from below that the first amounts he received from
McClung were "earnings," and last amounts transferred to him during the limitation period were
a "return of principal" and therefore not fraudulent transfers. This argument is unsupported by
authority. The decisions Mason cites recognize that the opposite is true -- that because a Ponzi
scheme by definition does not produce real "earnings" but is merely a shell game in which
different victims' funds are passed around by the perpetrator of the scheme, any amounts
received back by a victim up to his initial outlay are restitution, and once the victim has received
back that initial outlay, any amount he receives from the perpetrator thereafter is a fraudulent
transfer. Because there are no actual "earnings," Mason's argument that the first transfers from
McClung were not return of principal but were payment of earnings is factually unsupported and
incorrect.
The decision Mason mainly relies upon actually supports the Christians.

In

Donnell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2008), a Ninth Circuit panel recently explained exactly
the point set forth above.

The panel expressly rejected essentially the same argument Mason

attempts here. Its reasoning is instructive and directly persuasive, thus it is quoted here at length.
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First, the panel acknowledged that payments back to a Ponzi scheme victim up to the amount of
the victim's outlay to the perpetrator are not "return of principal," but are restitution to the
victim:
Payments of amounts up to the value of the initial investment are
not, however, considered a "return of principal," because the initial
payment is not considered a trne investment. Rather, investors are
permitted to retain these amounts because they have claims for
restitution or rescission against the debtor that operated the scheme
up to the amount of the initial investment. Payments up to the
amount of the initial investment are considered to be exchanged for
"reasonably equivalent value," and thus not fraudulent, because
they proportionally reduce the investors' rights to restitution.
United Energy, 944 F.2d at 595. If investors receive more than
they invested, "[p]ayments in excess of amounts invested are
considered fictitious profits because they do not represent a return
on legitimate investment activity."
533 F.3d at 772. Thus, the panel held, the trustee in the case before it could "presume that the

earliest payments received by the investor are payments against the investor's claim for
restitution.

Transfers in excess of that amount, made within the statute of limitations, are

avoidable as fraudulent conveyances." Id. at 774 (emphasis added). The panel then reiterated
that purported payments of "profits" from Ponzi scheme operators are merely payments of
restitution to a victim of the scheme, up to the amount of the victim's initial outlay, and
explained that payments beyond this amount are not a reasonably equivalent exchange for the
victim's initial outlay:
Payouts of "profits" made by Ponzi scheme operators are not
payments of return on investment from an actual business venture.
Rather, they are payments that deplete the assets of the scheme
operator for the purpose of creating the appearance of a profitable
business venture. . .. The appearance of a profitable business
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venture is used to convince early investors to "roll over" their
investment instead of withdrawing it, and to convince new
investors that the promised returns are guaranteed.... Up to the
amount that "profit" payments return the innocent investor's initial
outlay, these payments are settlements against the defrauded
investor's restitution claim. Up to this amount, therefore, there is an
exchange of "reasonably equivalent value" for the defrauded
investor's outlay. Amounts above this, however, are merely used to
keep the fraud going by giving the false impression that the
scheme is a profitable, legitimate business. These amounts are not
a "reasonably equivalent" exchange for the defrauded investor's
initial outlay.
In this case, Kowell never actually possessed an interest in a
company purchasing account receivables from Malaysian glove
manufacturers.
The investment strategy promised by
Wallenbrock's officers was a lie to induce Kowell and investors
like him to fund Wallenbrock. What Wallenbrock did was return to
Kowell his own money, plus money from subsequent "investors,"
to persuade Kowell to continue to invest and to secure testimonial
evidence from people like Kowell to induce others to invest.
Although Kowell was putting real money into Wallenbrock, and
was getting what looked like real profits in return, in fact he never
received "reasonably equivalent value" for his investment, just
cash that was moved around in an elaborate shell game.
Id. at 777-778 ( emphasis added; citations omitted).
The Ninth

Circuit panel's

analysis

applies here.

Mason's

attempted

characterization of the first payments to him as "earnings" is based on fiction, not fact.

What

McClung returned to Mason initially was his own money, and what he returned to Mason after
that was other investors' money "moved around in an elaborate shell game," i.e., a fraudulent
transfer. Mason has long since admitted in response to the Christians' Complaint that McClung
carried on a Ponzi scheme, and that the "gains" paid to victims were "fictitious."

CR 5-6

(Complaint); CR 22 (Answer). Those payments of fictitious "earnings" to Mason totaling were
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essentially payments toward his restitutions claim against McClung. Once Mason received that
total back from McClung he was fully compensated, and any additional amounts he received
were fraudulent transfers. Mason does not dispute that the amounts paid to him within the
UFTA limitations period include all amounts exceeding what he paid to McClung.

E.

Mason is not entitled to a fee award.

Mason requests an award of attorney's fees. He does not cite a statute or rule in
support of the request. The decision he cites deals with a fee award under I.C. § 12-121, which
allows for an award of fees in response to a frivolous action. He relies on the portion of the
decision referring to appeals which merely ask this court to second guess the district court's view
of conflicting evidence. It has no application here, where the material facts are undisputed, the
Christians' appeal deals largely with the district court's decision on a matter of law regarding the
effect of McClung' s bankruptcy on this case, and its decision is contrary to both the Bankruptcy
Code and the weight of case law on the subject. A fee award is not appropriate in this case.

III.

Conclusion.

The material facts are undisputed, and under those facts the Christian are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The district court's decision should be reversed with direction to
enter summary judgment in the Christians' favor.
Dated this 14th day of October, 2008.

Michael Christian
Attorneys for Plaintiff7Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of October, 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS in the above-referenced
matter by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
David A. Johnson, Esq.
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